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Let me begin by thanking the Journal of 
Medical Ethics editors and the four 
commentators for taking time to read, 
reflect and offer thoughtful comments on 
my paper. The issues they raise warrant 
careful attention. Regrettably, I am only 
able to address some of their key concerns 
due to space constraints. In my paper, 
‘Gestation, Equality and Freedom: Ecto-
genesis as a Political Perspective’, I outline 
two sets of critiques of liberal defences of 
ectogenesis and contend that these 
defences are limited in their reach and 
scope. Building on Federici’s,1 and Dalla 
Costa’s and James’2 readings of the of the 
international feminist campaign ‘Wages 
for Housework’, I argue that the value of 
ectogenesis is to similarly advance a polit-
ical perspective and a provocation. 
Framing ectogenesis in these terms enables 
to critically engage with the physical and 
social burdens of pregnancy, childbirth 
and childrearing, which all too often are 
borne by women. It also allows to demand 
for better medical and social services for 
mothers and women more generally, as 
well as better working and living condi-
tions for these and other disadvantaged 
groups.
Lisa Campo- Engelstein thoughtfully 
broadens my reading of liberal defences of 
ectogenesis and contextualises them within 
the history of ‘reproductive advancements 
and technologies’.3 She illustrates that 
claims concerning increased freedom and 
equality are not unique to ectogenesis. 
Using egg freezing as a case study, Campo- 
Engelstein argues that ‘medicine is not 
the best tool to ‘cure’ oppressive power 
systems’.3 Her perspective follows an 
important tradition in feminist literature 
that casts a sceptical gaze towards using 
technical means to ‘fix’ social problems. 
While I share her concerns, I have a more 
favourable view on using technologies to 
serve liberating ends. Technologies have 
been and can be instruments of liberation, 
if handled with care and with attention 
to the social circumstances in which they 
come into being.
In her commentary, Claire Horner 
disputes whether ectogenesis has any value 
at all, even of the kind that I am proposing. 
She argues that (1) critiques of ectogen-
esis do not give guidance regarding how 
to change unjust states of affairs and (2) 
the focus should not be on pregnancy but 
on the lack of ‘political and social support 
for all who parent’.4 According to Horner, 
ectogenesis’ value is ‘limited even in its 
ability to advance this political perspec-
tive’.4 My reading of Horner’s concerns is 
that they are of eminently political nature. 
The starting question of a debate on ecto-
genesis that seeks to further certain polit-
ical ends should be what, if anything, can 
guarantee ‘political and social support for 
all who parent’. Moreover, the answer to 
a strategic question should be whatever 
can, within certain limits, advance such 
political agenda. In this respect, there is 
a value in ectogenesis for it can advance 
a political project. One that—following 
Anne Phillips—considers equality as first 
of all ‘a claim and commitment: not as the 
outcome of an argument, nor as the effect 
of sentimental education’.5
Elizabeth Chloe Romanis’s comments 
hinge on two issues: first, laws governing 
reproduction need be reformed. Such 
reform is necessary to prevent technolog-
ical developments from furthering mech-
anisms of control over women’s bodies. 
Second, she argues, while my critiques of 
liberal defences of ectogenesis are nomi-
nally correct, they should be focused on 
partial rather than full ectogenesis. I share 
her view on the need for legal reforms and 
see her concern as part of broader calls 
for changing the social milieu surrounding 
technological developments, which often 
hinders rather than promotes women’s 
freedom and equality. Regarding the focus 
of the debate, Romanis and I advance 
compatible rather than mutually exclu-
sive perspectives. The focus should be on 
both partial and full ectogeneses, regard-
less of urgency- motivated views. Both 
practices are worth discussing and raise 
specific ethical and political challenges 
that need to be addressed. My only reser-
vation pertains to her view on the need 
to ‘prevent political capture of the tech-
nology’.6 Romanis fears this development 
as ‘[h]istorically, technology has been 
politically captured to afford increased 
legitimacy for measures that subject preg-
nant people to greater control’.6 While 
this is broadly accurate, my reaction—and 
the perspective that I advance—goes in 
another direction, that of co- opting tech-
nological developments to serve liberating 
political projects.
It is maybe for this political co- opting 
that I earned the title of ‘radical’ in Glenn 
Cohen’s commentary. Cohen advances 
three critiques to my paper. He argues 
that it (1) undercounts the potential bene-
fits of ectogenesis, (2) sets the bar too high 
for the technology’s permissibility and (3) 
de- emphasises risks concerning women’s 
abortion rights7. Regarding the first 
critique, Cohen is right: ectogenesis—as 
other reproductive technologies—is likely 
to benefit groups whose freedom and 
equality in procreative matters are signifi-
cantly curtailed. This is an important 
benefit and, other things being equal, a 
prima facie reason to support the develop-
ment of this practice. Cohen also correctly 
points out that ectogenesis might pose 
risks to women’s abortion rights. Abor-
tion rights—and the rights of groups who 
have been systematically discriminated in 
procreation—warrant attention. I did not 
address these issues in my paper, as its 
scope was limited to discussions of liberal 
defences of ectogenesis, which often 
revolve around women. Regarding the 
second critique, Cohen correctly points 
out that ‘the Perfect cannot be the enemy 
of the Good’, and I do share his pragma-
tism. What is missing in his critique is an 
appreciation of the prioritarian nature 
of my arguments. Ectogenesis will likely 
benefit some women and increase their 
equality and freedom. However, it will 
increase the equality and freedom of those 
who do not need such increase the most. 
Moreover, I doubt that no one will be made 
worse off, as he claims. Women belonging 
to disadvantaged groups—who can come 
to be deemed ‘substandard gestators’8—
might be harmed by the development of 
ectogenesis. Whether greater control will 
be exercised on these women after the 
introduction of ectogenesis is an empirical 
question, but it is one that the history of 
control over women’s reproductive bodies 
does not let us be overly optimistic about.
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